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CI want to correct one exception to Keran’s otherwise quite
accurate summary of my work. Keran asserts (p. 16) that
I constructed the “modihed-nentralized” money stock, which
implicitly treats gold flows as if they svere offset by Federal
Reserve actions, because the Federal Reserve likely offsets
such flows. My real reason for calculating this is clearly
stated in time paragraph immediately preceding the figure
containing the modified-neutralized money stock:
The appropriateness of a comparison of Federal Reserve
policy actions with the expressed intent of policymakers
depends on whether the definition of policy actions em-
ployed is the same as that which the policymakers had in
mind ~vhen they discussed their actions and issued
directives.
Since it is likely that policy statements refer to
actions net of offsetting gold movements, a modified-
neutralized money stock, which differs from the neutral-
ized money stock in that the impact of the business cycle
is not removed from the gold reserves component, is
calculated and compared with the expressed intent of
policymakers (p. 132).
A footnote is attached to this paragraph pointing out that a
“neutral” policy was defined in the FOMC minutes as staying
out of the market after olisetting gold flows.) Thus, Keran’s
statement (p. 16) that there “is no reason why I’Iendershott
should have stopped with allowing only for offsetting actions
with respect to gold” is incorrect.
Neutralization of the Money Stock
by PATRIC H. HENDERSHOTT°
I HE AUGUST 1969 ISSUE of this Review con-
tained three papers dealing with the adequacies of
the observed money stock as an indicator of Federal
Reserve policy actions. In the first paperi, Emanuel
Melichar asserted, on the basis of my analysis2, that
the money stock is an inaccurate measure of policy
actions. He suggested as an alternative my neutral-
ized money stock — the observed money stock after
removal of the impact of the business cycle. In the
second paper3, Michael Keran argued that observed
money is a better indicator than neutralized money
because the Federal Reserve offsets the impact of
the business cycle on the money stock,m Finally, in
the third paper,5 Leonall Andersen examines em-
pirically the argument that the money stock is influ-
enced by the business cycle. He concludes that it
is not.
In this short note, I first consider Keran’s theoretical
argumnent against neutralizing the money stock.
Keran’s argument is a familiar one that I had hoped
my book would put to rest. I then point out that the
results of Andersen’s empirical work are neither in-
consistent with my results nor very surprising. Ander-
sen defines his monetary policy variable so broadly
that there is scarcely any room left for an endogenous
money stock.
I ~
Keran’s principal argument is that money is an
exogenous variable controlled by the Federal Reserve,
not an endogenous variable, and thus that it is the
best measure of Federal Reserve policy actions. He
seems willing to acknowledge that the banking sys-
tem’s demand for free reserves, foreigners’ demand
for the U.S. gold stock, and the public’s demand for
commercial bank time deposits are all negatively re-
lated to U.S. interest rates. lie contends that money
is not endogenous because the Federal Reserve acts
to offset the impact of these responses on the money
stock.FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS MAY, 1970
The concept of an endogenous money stock can be
fonnalized as follows. The money stock depends upon
the actions of the Federal Reserve, denoted by the
vector MP, and a vector of interest rates R:
(1) M=f(MP,R),
where MP is defined so that increases in it lead to
increases in M. Since an increase in interest rates
leads to increases in free reserves and time deposits,
which are uses of reserves, and to a decline in the
U.S. gold stock, whiclm is a source of reserves, money
is unambiguously related to B in a positive manner.
The MP vector includes a source-of-bank-reserves
variable, legal reserve requirements., the discount rate,
ceiling rates on time and saving deposits, and other
selective controls sometimes employed. In my book
I treated the Federal Reserve’s portfollo of govern-
ment securities plus various minor reserve compo-
nents as the source-of-bank-reserves variable.7 Here I
adjust this variable for changes in legal reserve re-
quirements, denote it by P4, and substitute ~* for
MP, thereby capturing the principal monetaiy policy
instruments in one variable:
(2) M = g(P*R),
Let us make the unlikely assumption that the Fed-
eral Reserve always varies P” so as to offset exactly
the impact on M of changes in B. For example, if R
falls, the Federal Reserve raises Pa by precisely
enough to hold money constant. This would, indeed,
remove money from the class of endogenous varia-
bles.8 But it would hardly make the money stock an
accurate indicator of Federal Reserve actions. In fact,
we have explicitly assumed, following Keran, that
every time interest rates change, the Federal Reserve
takes actions that, on net, are not reflected in the
money stock. And these actions are quite interesting.
Since interest rates have tended to fall just prior to,
or concurrently with, the onset of U.S. recessions,
Keran implicitly admits that the Federal Reserve has
taken expansive actions at this crucial juncture of the
cycle. Moreover, because the money stock is un-
changed, his position forces him to conclude that the
Federal Reserve is essentially doing nothing.° Since
7
The minor reserve components are those Keran denoted by
C, and 0. 5
The endogenous tendency of money would, of course, still
remain. That is, if the Federal Reserve ceased to follow its
offsetting policy, money would hehave endogenously.
9
Keran’s views are q,uite similar to those expressed by Cul-
bertson in “Reply,’ Southern Economic Journal, (April
1963), pp. 330-35. For a detailed critique of Culhertson’s
position, see Hendershott, pp. 99-102,
only those actions over and above the offsetting ones
are attributed to the Federal Reserve, this procedure
is clearly biased toward an unfavorable interpreta-
tion of anti-recession policies. In contrast, I have
argued that all Federal Reserve actions should be
credited to the monetary authority.10 Thus, in order
to obtain an unbiased measure of Federal Reserve
pohcy actions, I removed the impact of the business
cycle from the money stock, leaving a series whose
cyclical movement reflects only Federal Reserve ac-
tions (and other exogenous forces).
For an ifiustration of the implications of Keran’s
view, consider a business recession that leads banks
to sell securities to the public and repay its borrowing
from the Federal Reserve. Since the public gives up
deposits in this exchange with banks, the stock of
money declines. If the Federal Reserve offsets this
decline by purchasing securities (in particular, by
purchasing tIme securities the banks wish to sell,
thereby preventing interest rates from rising and
money demand from falling), Keran would interpret
the Federal Reserve as doing nothing; if the Federal
Reserve does nothing, Keran would interpret it as
taking restrictive actions; if the Federal Reserve off-
sets only part of the decline by purchasing a portion
of the securities banks are selling, Keran would inter-
pret it as selling securities.
Keran’s defense of the observed money stock as
the best indicator of Federal Reserve policy actions
is very reminiscent of the argument of those who use
observed interest rates as the indicator of policy ac-
tions. The latter would view a decline in interest
rates during a recession as indicative of an easy
monetary policy, even if the Federal Reserve were
partially offsetting a decline in private security sup-
ply by selling securities. Keran vie~vsa decline in
the money stock during recessions as indicating re-
strictive actions, even if the Federal Reserve were
partially offsetting a decline in bank demand by
purchasing securities. The views are, of course,
equally erroneous.”
Perhaps an analogy with fiscal policy will make
my argument even more compelling. Say that the
I0ljendershott, pp. 93-99.
liIn addition to the discussion in The Neutralized Money
Stock, pp. 1-5, see Fatric Hendershott and George Florwich,
“Money, Interest, and Policy,” Institute Paper No. 250,
Krennert Graduate School of Industrial Administration,
Purdue University (June 1969), pp. 21-23 and 29-31.
(This paper was presented at the U.S. Savings and Loan
League Conference on Saving and Residential Financing
in May 1969 and ‘vill be published in the proceedings
of the conference.)
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Federal Government raised tax rates during reces-
sions in order to maintain a constant, balanced budget.
Would we view this fiscal policy as being contrac-
tionary or not? The “old view” is that since the budget
is still balanced, policy must be neutral. The “new
view,” which is based on the “high-employment budget
surplus” concept and to which the St. Louis Federal
Reserve Bank subscribes,12 says that policy is restric-
tive because the Government actually raised tax rates.
If we were to apply Keran’s analysis, we would be
led to the old view. That is, Keran would “not count”
the increase in tax rates because it was an automatic
offsetting response to the decline in tax receipts ac-
companying the recession. Thus, the fiscal policy of
raising tax rates during recessions would be inter-
preted as a neutral policy with respect to the business
cycle.
As I pointed out in my book, the neutralized
money stock measure of monetary policy is analogous
to the full-employment budget surplus measure of
fiscal policy; the impact of the business cycle is
absent from both. To accept one measure and not
the other is inconsistent and, I suspect, quite reveal-
ing of one’s biases.
Andersen has taken a quite narrow view of the
endogenous money stock concept. In particular, he
views the money stock as being related to a monetary
policy variable and gross national product (GNP). In
light of the free-reserves, gold, and time-deposits
‘
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See Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Review (August
1969), p. 4.
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responses noted above the money stock should be
related to a policy variable and interest rates. And
such a distinction is important. For example, I con-
cluded that GNP has had only a small impact on
money, where interest rates have had a large impact.13
In addition to relating the money stock to the
“wrong” endogenous variable, Andersen defines the
monetary policy variable so broadly that his inability
to estimate successfully an endogenous money stock
relation is hardly surprising. In particular, the two
reserve components that I found to be primarily re-
sponsible for the strong stock-interest rate relation —
member bank borrowings from the Federal Reserve
and the U.S. gold stock — are treated as policy-de-
termined by Andersen.i4 The only interest rate rela-
tions that Andersen allows are the admittedly weak
excess-reserves relation and a stronger time deposit
relatmon which has however only a small impact on
the money stock.
In conclusion, Andersen’s empirical estimates are
based on a model which, by choice of the policy and
endogenous variables, rules out the expected money
stock links to the economy. Thus, the estimates should
not be interpreted either as a criticism of my work or




l4hjendershoft, p. 117 and Keran, p. 16. Subsequent dis-
covery of a computational error in the neutralization of the
money stock reveals that the gold relation was not as
strong as initially believed. For a discussion of the error
and an analysis of the correctly neutralized money stock,
see Patric Hendershntt, “A Quality Theory of Money,”
Nebraska Journal of Economics and Business (Autumn
1969), or Hendershntt and Horwich, pp. 25-28.
The Comment to this article begins on the next page.
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